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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides confidentiality and integrity to an enterprise and its 
customers. Applications accessed through corporate network needs to be protected when in transit 
and hence the need for a Certificate Authority (CA). Most enterprises currently purchase digital 
certificates from other Certificate Authorities, for instance Comodo, Symantec, Digicert, Thwate, 
GoDadddy, etc. Others purchase through third parties for instance Cloud Productivity Solutions in 
Kenya who then get their digital certificates from GeoTrust. These certificates are used to 
guarantee secure communication when accessing services on servers within an organisation. The 
main challenge of buying of the certificates is the high purchase cost of single or Subject 
Alternative Name (SAN) certificates. By having their own Certificate Authority, digital certificates 
would cost less and give an enterprise the means to control large numbers of Digital Certificates 
for SSL, authentication, document signing, S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions) and other usages of digital signatures. This implies that costs would be reduced by 
generation of enterprise-owned digital certificates instead of purchasing them. 
By understanding the current infrastructure in place, a CA was created for generation distribution 
and revocation of SSL certificates. This would replace purchasing of certificates signed by other 
public Certificate Authorities.  
This dissertation sought to design, develop and implement a comprehensive CA as per the X.509 
standard for the purpose of generation of certificates for internal use for corporates and selling of 
the same to generate revenue so as to cut on costs incurred on purchase of digital certificates. Also 
a proof of concept of a private CA was used to validate the certificate authority with security of 
the Certificate Authority being considered.   








List of Acronyms 
CA  Certificate Authority 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure  
CIA  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability  
CPS  Certificate Practice Statement 
CSR     Certificate Signing Request 
KES  Kenya Shillings 
LDAP  Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
PKCS  Public Key Cryptographic Systems 
PKI   Public Key Infrastructure 
HSM  Hardware Security Module 
ITU-T  International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Section 
GUI  Graphical User Interface 
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 
SAN  Subject Alternative Name 
SSL  Secure Sockets Layer  
UML  Unified Modelling Language 
OCSP  Online Certificate Status Protocol 





Table of Contents 
Declaration ..................................................................................................................................................... i 
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................ iv 
List of Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures ................................................................................................................................................ x 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................ xi 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Background of Study .......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 X.509 Standard ............................................................................................................................ 2 
1.1.2 Other Applications of Digital Certificates ................................................................................... 2 
1.1 Problem Statement ........................................................................................................................ 5 
1.2 Research Objectives ............................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 Research Questions ............................................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 Scope of Study .................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Limitations .......................................................................................................................................... 6 
1.6 Justification of Research ..................................................................................................................... 7 
1.7 Summary ............................................................................................................................................. 7 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 X.509 Standard ................................................................................................................................... 8 
2.3 Design of Systems ............................................................................................................................... 9 
2.3.1 Certificate Authority .................................................................................................................... 9 
2.3.2 Trust Models ................................................................................................................................ 9 
2.3.3 CA Hierarchy Options ............................................................................................................... 10 
2.4 Digital Certificate Trust Chain .......................................................................................................... 12 
2.5 Let’s Encrypt ..................................................................................................................................... 12 




2.7 Financial Return on Investment ........................................................................................................ 14 
2.8 Current Certificate Authority Tools .................................................................................................. 15 
2.8.1 Enterprise Java Beans Certificate Authority .............................................................................. 15 
2.8.2 Windows Server 2012 Certificate Authority .............................................................................. 16 
2.8.3 Linux Based OpenSSL Certificate Authority ............................................................................ 16 
2.9 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 3: Research Methodology ............................................................................................................. 17 
3.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 17 
3.2 Research Methodology Steps ............................................................................................................ 17 
3.2.1 Research ..................................................................................................................................... 18 
3.2.2 Certificate Authority Identification of Tools ............................................................................. 19 
3.2.3 Prototype Design ........................................................................................................................ 19 
3.2.4 Certificate Authority Prototyping .............................................................................................. 19 
3.2.5 Testing ........................................................................................................................................ 19 
3.2.6 Research Validation ................................................................................................................... 20 
3.3 Ethical Measures ............................................................................................................................... 20 
3.4 Location of Study .............................................................................................................................. 20 
3.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 20 
Chapter 4: System Analysis and Design ...................................................................................................... 21 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 21 
4.2 Research Findings ............................................................................................................................. 21 
4.2.1 Digital Certificate Cost Findings ............................................................................................... 22 
4.2.2 Research Findings Conclusions ................................................................................................. 24 
4.3 Certificate Tools Findings ................................................................................................................. 24 
4.4 System Design and Architecture ....................................................................................................... 24 
4.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 24 
4.4.2 Certificate Authority Analysis ................................................................................................... 24 
4.4.3 Certificate Authority Data Processing and Modeling ................................................................ 26 




Chapter 5: Prototyping and Prototype Testing ........................................................................................... 34 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 34 
5.2 Development Environment ............................................................................................................... 34 
5.3 Certificate Authority Set-up .............................................................................................................. 34 
5.3.1 Root Certificate Authority ......................................................................................................... 34 
5.3.2 Subordinate CA CSR signing .................................................................................................... 35 
5.3.3 Certificate List ........................................................................................................................... 36 
5.3.4 Certificate Revocation................................................................................................................ 38 
5.3.5 Certificate Auto-enrollment ....................................................................................................... 38 
5.3.6 OCSP Responder ....................................................................................................................... 38 
5.3.7 Certificate Auto-enrollment ....................................................................................................... 39 
5.4 Certificate Issuance Process .............................................................................................................. 40 
5.5 Prototype Testing .............................................................................................................................. 41 
5.5.1 User Tests ................................................................................................................................... 41 
5.6 Cost of Setting Up and Running a Private CA .................................................................................. 45 
5.7 Cost Analysis .................................................................................................................................... 48 
5.8 Prototype Validation ......................................................................................................................... 52 
5.9 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 52 
Chapter. 6: Discussions of Results .............................................................................................................. 53 
6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 53 
6.2 Explanation of Findings .................................................................................................................... 53 
6.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................................... 53 
6.4 Advantages of the Private Certificate Authority versus Purchasing of Certificates. ........................ 54 
6.5 Disadvantages of the Private Certificate Authority Prototype .......................................................... 54 
6.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 55 
Chapter 7: Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Work ................................................................... 56 
7.1 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 56 




7.3 Future Work ...................................................................................................................................... 57 
References .................................................................................................................................................. 58 
APPENDIX I: Digital Certificates Interview Questions ................................................................................. 61 
APPENDIX II: User Experience Feedback ..................................................................................................... 62 




















List of Figures 
Figure 2.1 CA Hierarchies   .......................................................................................................... 11 
Figure 2.2 Certificate Trust Chain ................................................................................................ 12 
Figure 2.3 Cost Considerations for Private CA ............................................................................ 14 
Figure 2.4 Business Case Analysis Methodologies for Certificate Authority .............................. 15 
Figure 3.1 Research Methodology Steps ...................................................................................... 18 
Figure 4.1 Process Workflow Diagram ........................................................................................ 27 
Figure 4.2 Use Case Diagram ....................................................................................................... 28 
Figure 4.3 Sequence Diagram ....................................................................................................... 31 
Figure 4.4 Level 0 Data Flow Diagram ........................................................................................ 31 
Figure 4.5 Level 1 Data Flow Diagram ........................................................................................ 32 
Figure 5.1 Root CA Setup ............................................................................................................. 35 
Figure 5.2 Submitted Request from Subordinate CA ................................................................... 36 
Figure 5.3 Issued Certificate from Root CA ................................................................................. 36 
Figure 5.4 Root and Subordinate CA Certificate Chain ............................................................... 37 
Figure 5.5 Certificate Trust Chain ................................................................................................ 37 
Figure 5.6 Enabling Auto-Enrollment .......................................................................................... 38 
Figure 5.7 OCSP Responder ......................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 5.8 Certificate Auto Enrollment Platform ......................................................................... 40 
Figure 5.9 User Friendliness ......................................................................................................... 42 
Figure 5.10 Ease of Use ................................................................................................................ 43 
Figure 5.11 System Responsiveness ............................................................................................. 44 
Figure 5.12 System Usage ............................................................................................................ 44 
Figure 5.13 Breakeven Point when Selling at $20 ........................................................................ 49 
Figure 5.14 Breakeven Point when Selling at $30 ........................................................................ 50 






List of Tables  
Table 1.1 Digital Certificate Prices ................................................................................................. 3 
Table 4.1 SSL Certificates Prices ................................................................................................. 23 
Table 4.2 Build Root CA .............................................................................................................. 29 
Table 4.3 Create Subordinate CA ................................................................................................. 29 
Table 4.4 Generate Certificate ...................................................................................................... 29 
Table 5.1 Software Requirements ................................................................................................. 34 
Table 5.2 Test Cases ..................................................................................................................... 41 
Table 5.3 Test Cases ..................................................................................................................... 42 
Table 5.4 Cost Comparison........................................................................................................... 46 
Table 5.5 Cost Comparison over Two Years ................................................................................ 47 
Table 5.6 Cost Analysis I .............................................................................................................. 48 
Table 5.7 Cost Analysis II ............................................................................................................ 49 
Table 5.8 Cost Analysis III ........................................................................................................... 50 
Table 5.9 Cost Analysis IV ........................................................................................................... 51 
Table 6.1 Breakeven Points for Different Scenarios .................................................................... 54 










Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of Study 
Data stored on a network or transmitted from one user to another must be protected from fraudulent 
access and misdirection, hence the importance of security. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) refers 
to the technical mechanisms, procedures and policies that collectively provide a framework for 
addressing authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. PKI utilises these two 
core elements: Public Key Cryptography and Certification Authorities. Binding of digital 
certificates is established through a process of registration and issuance of certificates at and by 
Certificate Authority which may be automated or carried out under human supervision.   
In public key cryptography, a public key is known to all while the private key is only known to the 
owner. Since the two keys are mathematically related, whatever is encrypted with a public key 
may only be decrypted by its corresponding private key in the key pair (Brink, 2002) and whatever 
is encrypted with a private key is decrypted by its corresponding public key in the key pair. 
The use of enterprise-owned Certificate Authority can be an effective way to meet business 
requirements. The ease of installation, use, maintenance and cost of a Certificate Authority 
solution can help enterprises determine the solution that best meets their requirements. It is 
important to review the components of a CA before addressing requirements and solutions. 
One of the primary concerns identified by both businesses and consumers in establishing and 
participating in e-business is the potential loss of assets due to security breaches of commercial 
transactions and corporate computer systems. A security breach not only erodes confidence in the 
business but also affects the organisation’s reputation capital. Case studies demonstrate risks that 
include sabotage, vandalism, loss of data confidentiality and integrity, theft of data, fraud and 
breaches of privacy (Verizon, 2017). 
When using the digital certificates to secure servers (for instance web servers), certificates that are 
generated are used to provide an end-to-end secure flow of communication. A certificate 
establishes trust between the client, server and issuer of certificates (Certificate Authority), as well 




1.1.1 X.509 Standard 
Since the introduction of this standard for PKI, X.509 standard had been used in generation of 
digital certificates. This has become a critical part for enterprises, government and consumers. 
When selecting an X.509 solution, organisations must consider not only the robustness of the 
technology and the reputation of the provider, but also affordability of the solution and the cost-
savings it can provide (Entrust, 2005). 
In the original X.509 standard, PKI is referred to as strong authentication leveraging a family of 
cryptographic systems known as Public Key Cryptographic Systems (PKCS). The standard does 
not necessitate a specific encryption algorithm, but describes itself as a framework applicable to 
any suitable public key cryptosystem (Melone, 2012). 
This standard specifies formats for public key certificates, certificates revocation lists, attribute 
certificates and certificate path validation algorithm.  
1.1.2 Other Applications of Digital Certificates 
Digital Signature 
This is based on public key cryptography where one can generate two keys that are mathematically 
linked: one public and another private as a pair. The private key is used to generate a digital 
signature attached to a message, and the receiver uses the sender’s certificate to verify the digital 
signature (CGI Group Inc, 2004). This gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was 
created by a known sender (authentication), the sender cannot deny having sent the message (non-
repudiation) and that he message was not altered in transit (integrity). 
Encryption of Documents  
In this, a certificate can be used implicitly for purposes of encryption whereby, the sender of a 
digital message uses the receiver’s certificate to encrypt the message so as to protect the message 
to protect the confidentiality of the message. Only the receiver can use his/her private key to 
decrypt the message.  
Organisations and people that use computers can describe their needs for information security and 




Certificate Authority is generally considered to be associated with the four factors, confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.  
When an enterprise is responsible for the safe keeping of third party information, the burden of 
care goes up and the risks go up with it. Certificate Authority enables distribution, management, 
expiration, rollover, backup and revoking of public/private keys. The owners/users of these keys 
can be people, devices or applications. There are options of purchasing single certificates and/or 
multi-domain certificates known as unified communications certificate (UCC) which is multi-
domain certificates, whereby they allow one to secure a primary domain, and up to 99 additional 
Subject Alternative Names (SAN), in a single UCC.  
Today in Kenya most enterprises purchase digital certificates to secure transactions for the services 
accessed by the public through a browser and alternatively use self-signed certificates for the 
internally accessed services since these have already formed a web of trust among themselves. 
However, the purchase price of these digital certificates is quite high and hence the need for a 
cheaper option. Table 1.1 gives a summary of digital certificate prices that are valid for one year 
from different Certificate Authorities. 




Product Name 1Year 
Price 
Type Encryption 
Comodo CA Positive SSL $49.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Standard SSL $69.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA  Instant  SSL $99.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA  Comodo SSL $99.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Deluxe SSL $99.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Thwate Thwate 123 $149.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Geotrust Quick SSL Premium $149.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Positive SSL Wildcard $149.95 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Premium SSL $179.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 




Geotrust TrueBusiness ID $199.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Premium SSL  $99.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Global Sign Domain ServerSign $249.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Thwate Webserver Certificate with EV $299.00 One Domain 128/256 bit  
Geotrust TrueBusiness ID with EV $299.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Standard SSL Wildcard $299.99 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Globalsign Organisation ServerSign $349.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Symantec Secure Site SSL $399.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Deluxe SSL WildCard $399.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA EV SSL Certiticate $249.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Premium SSL Wilcard $449.95 Wilcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Comodo SSL Wildcard $449.95 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Thwate Wildcard SSL Certificate $559.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Geotrust TrueBusiness ID wildcard $599.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit  
GlobalSign Domain Serversign Wildcard $849.00 Wilcard 128/256 bit 
GlobalSign Organisation Serversign Wildcard $949.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Symantec Secure Site Pro $995.00 One Domain 128/256 bit  
Symantec Secure Site Pro with EV $1499.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
 
The challenge for many organisations is how to bridge the gap from their current IT infrastructure, 
to enhanced security using a Certificate Authority. A Certificate Authority can be either in-house 
or managed (outsourced). An in-house one is implemented by operating a private CA which gives 
maximum level of control. Also, interoperability problems between the CA and the corporate 
applications are minimised and the issue of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) is greatly 
simplified. A managed CA solution gives access to digital certificates without the need to buy, 
establish, operate and protect an in-house CA. On the other hand, external CAs receives certificate 
requests from individual enterprises and validates the domain through the local registration 
authority, KENIC (Kenya Network Information Centre) .KE domains. This is possible since 
KENIC grants license for reselling of .KE domains to other registrars. Once this is done the 




The main challenge with not owning a Certificate Authority is the cost involved in buying the 
certificates. Also, it costs almost nothing to generate digital certificates. The major requirement 
would be to abide by the law of the land; in this case, it would be The Kenya information and 
Communications Act 2010 which stipulates the terms and conditions for anything that involves 
electronic transaction.  Let’s Encrypt, which is a free and open certificate authority in 2017 had 
96.7 % of the 15,270 issued certificates used for phishing sites (Lync, 2017). Also its limited since 
it can only be used for web servers. This therefore leaves out S/MIME and client certificates as 
options not taken care of by Let’s Encrypt.  
In conclusion, implementation of a Certificate Authority requires proper planning in terms of cost, 
future applications that may need to support with the CA. However, this is not mandatory since 
applications that the CA may support may not have been conceived yet. This therefore implies that 
a CA should incorporate a lot of flexibility. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The cost of a digital certificate depends on whether it is a single certificate (which translates to 
more money spent in the long run) or a multi-domain certificate. Based on this, there is need to 
propose a solution that will allow enterprises to manage their own Certificate Authority for 
generation of digital certificates at a much lower cost. A wildcard certificate through a third party 
costs approximately KES. 315,000. Also, for a multi-domain digital certificate which can have a 
maximum of four digital certificates costs approximates KES. 75,000 through the same third party, 
both of which are valid for two years.  
Based on this, there was need to propose a solution that would allow enterprises to have their 
Certificate Authority for management of digital certificates. This was proposed for the services 
used internally by the enterprise and selling solely to the enterprise customers so as to cut down 
on digital certificate purchase cost. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
i. To identify challenges in the Public Certificate Authority, 
ii. To review Certificate Authority tools, 
iii. To design, implement and test a private Certificate Authority by use of a prototype, 




1.3 Research Questions 
i) What are the challenges experienced with a Public Certificate Authority? 
ii) What tools exist for private Certificate Authorities implementation? 
iii) How can a Certificate Authority be designed and developed to reduce Certificate costs? 
iv) Does the prototype provide a secure and cost effective alternative for private 
companies? 
1.4 Scope of Study 
This study entailed conducting a research on the costs implication of having a private Certificate 
Authority in an enterprise rather than buying of digital certificates. This also involved 
consideration for selling the certificates solely to their enterprise customers who would be on-
boarded on to their network in the process of offering managed security services. This involved 
designing and implementation of a prototype that could be customized into a full solution based 
on the needs of any enterprise.   
In the building of the prototype, the research sought to create a virtualised system that would be 
used for the purpose of replicating how the Certificate Authority would be in use in a real 
environment: by generation, distribution, revocation, use and management of digital certificates 
using Telkom Kenya Limited as a case study.  
1.5 Limitations 
The main limitation was getting trust from other Certificate Authorities. It is easy to focus only on 
Certificate generation, treat it as just another piece of infrastructure, focus on quality of service, 
uptime and resilience. However, what makes a Certificate Authority special is that it forms the 
trust anchor for all the systems and applications that rely on the credentials that it issues. Trust is 
like beauty, it is subjective and contextual- It is in the eyes of the beholder (Moulds, 2016). This 
is dependent on how certificates are handled (issued, published, archived, revoked and renewed) 
and is usually defined in the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) (Boeyen, 1997). Building trust 
involves certificate chains and path validation. One of the ways of building trust in a larger 
community of trusted certificates involves declaring trust in a group of top level (root) CAs (Haine, 





1.6 Justification of Research 
Most Kenyan enterprises that have the need for digital certificates spend a large amount of money 
buying certificates every so often. However, implementing a private Certificate authority enables 
an enterprise to generate their own certificates and thereby reduce the cost of purchase of digital 
certificates by generating certificates for internal use and selling certificates solely to their 
enterprise customers. Other than cost benefits, the enterprise gets to control the full Certificate 
Authority architecture. 
1.7 Summary 
The Certificate Authority technology has majorly assisted in the accomplishment of integrity, 
confidentiality, authentication and non-repudiation. In this chapter, the challenge of costs of digital 
certificates from other Certificate Authorities was looked into, which enabled the problem 
statement to be outlined inclusive of the objectives of this research.  In the next chapter, literature 
in the Certificate Authority which mainly relies on Public Key Infrastructure, design and 















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Completely securing the enterprise today requires more than just purchasing a digital certificate. 
Picking the right Certificate Authority is not always a straight forward process. Price is a factor as 
IT budgets continue to feel the squeeze (Flavio, 2015). Most enterprises have in the past 
concentrated on buying of digital certificates from other Certificate Authorities and have not 
exploited the need to set up their own Certificate Authority. 
2.2 X.509 Standard  
Certificate Authority is part of PKI which is governed by the X.509 standard published by 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T). The X.509 is used for public key management, 
including distributing of digital certificates with a high degree of confidence in binding between 
the users and their public keys (Chokhani, 1996).  
The information included in an X.509 certificate is: 
i. Version: This is the version of the certificate  
ii. Serial Number: A unique identifier assigned by the CA to the certificate 
iii. Signature algorithm: This is the hashing algorithm used for digital signature o the 
certificate. 
iv. Issuer: This is the Certification Authority that issued the certificate 
v. Valid from: The date of issuance of the Certificate 
vi. Valid to: This is the expiry date of the certificate 
vii. Subject: This is the distinguished name of the owner of the certificate  
viii. Public Key: This is the public key which is associated with the private key 
ix. Thumbprint algorithm: This is the algorithm used to create the certificate hash 
x. Thumbprint: The hash of the certificate which is used for positive identification of the 
certificate  
The X.509 certificate allows an extension field that permits any number of additional fields to be 
added to the certificate. Certificate extensions provide a way of adding information such as 




2.3 Design of Systems 
The design of systems gives the existing design model of the Certificate Authority and what it 
entails. This section mainly covers the creation, storage and distribution of digital certificates and 
processes thereof. 
2.3.1 Certificate Authority  
This is the entity that digitally signs certificates. It validates requestor’s (web servers, users, 
computers etc.) identity, issues certificates, and maintains certificate status information regarding 
certificates and issues. It is assumed that a RA (Registration Authority) is part of both the root CA 
and the Intermediate CA. The role of the RA is to pre-authenticate user identities based on physical 
world artifacts, and communicate the user identity (consisting) of set attributes to the CA. In 
reality, the RA can be separate from the CA in which case, additional trust relationships between 
the CA and the RA are required (Josang, 2013). 
2.3.2 Trust Models 
Certificate Authority (CA) has a well-structured hierarchical trust model.  This is mainly based on 
path validation, which is the process of verifying the integrity of the certificate chain up to a trusted 
CA (SANS, 2013) 
a. General Trust Model 
A public key on a certificate can allow a message encoded with the public key’s corresponding 
private key to be read. Therefore, the public key of the root CA certificates in the browser can be 
used to read the signature of their child CA issued certificates. This way each certificate issued by 
the chain can be verified and authenticated, implying the certificate issued to the web server can 
be verified and the identity of the server can be authenticated (Geraint, 2015). 
i) Root Certificate Authority  
The root CA’s private key sign certificates it issues. The root certificate is a self-signed certificate 
that identifies the root CA. The most common commercial variety is based on the ITU-T X.509 
standard (Trusted Root Certificate, 2012) . A root Certificate is the top-most certificate of the tree, 




issuing CAs and policy CAs.  All certificates immediately below the root certificate inherit the 
trustworthiness of the root certificate. Root CAs does not issue certificates for users or devices.  
To minimize the risk of unauthorised access, the root CA is usually put offline. It is powered off 
after generation of the root certificate to intermediate CAs and also place in a physically secure 
place (Microsoft, 2011). 
ii) Intermediate CA 
This is subordinate to a high-level CA and is designed to issue certificates to other CAs. It is used 
as a proxy since the root CA must be kept behind layers of security, ensuring its keys are absolutely 
inaccessible (GoDaddy, 2015). 
iii) Issuing CA 
This CA issues certificate to users, devices and applications. It may perform the function of a 
policy CA if one is not above it in the CA hierarchy.  
iv) Policy CA 
This CA describes the policies and procedures that an organisation implements to ensure processes 
that validate the identity of certificates holders, and the processes that enforce the procedures that 
manage certificates are in place. A policy CA issues certificates only to other CAs which upon 
receiving these certificates must uphold and enforce the policies that the policy CA defined 
(Lintner, 2002).  
It is not mandatory to use policy CAs unless different sectors of an organisation require different 
issuance policies and procedures. However, if an organisation requires different issuance policies 
and procedure, a policy CA must be added to hierarchy to define each unique policy (Wiseman, 
2012).  
2.3.3 CA Hierarchy Options 
Single/One-tier Hierarchy 
This consists of a single CA, usually consisting of both the root CA and issuing CA. Since the root 
CA is the trust anchor, any applications, users and/or computers that trust the root CA also trust 





This consists of an offline root CA which is the root instance of the CA trust chain. The first Active 
Directory Certificate Service (AD CS) instance installed will need to be the root CA since it 
establishes the trust hierarchy (Remy, 2016). 
It also consists of a subordinate CA which is a child node in the PKI trust chain. This is one level 
under the root CA.  
Three-Tier Hierarchy 
This hierarchy model consists of three layers. This has the root, intermediate and issuing CA 
separately. In this intermediate CAs are also referred to as policy/subordinate CAs.  Assuming that 
the root CA is trusted, the issuing CA validates the intermediate CA, which in turn validates the 
issuing level. The issuing level CA in turns validates the individuals to whom the CA issues 
certificates, (Neubauer, 2003). Each level provides a certificate to the level below it and defines 
policies that govern things for instance certificate use and lifetimes. This therefore forms a 
certificate chain as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 




2.4 Digital Certificate Trust Chain 
A Certificate Trust Chain begins with Digital Certificate and each Certificate in the chain is signed 
by the entity identified by the next certificate in the chain. This chain terminates with the Root CA 
Certificate which is signed by the Root CA itself. The signatures of all certificates in the chain 
must be verified up to the Root CA Certificate. Figure 2.2 indicates the trust chain concept.  
 
Figure 2.2 Certificate Trust Chain (Symantec, 2017) 
Any compromise on the Certificate Authority translates to untrusted Certificates hence the 
Certificates have to be revoked. Case in point is where Symantec issued one hundred and eight 
credentials in violation of strict industry guidelines that the organisation agreed to abide by when 
it made the mistake in 2015 (Hruska, 2017). Nine of the certificates were issued without the 
permission or knowledge of the affected domain orders, while the other ninety nine were issued to 
companies with fake data (Goodin, 2017). Also, the number rose from one hundred and twenty-
seven to thirty thousand certificates issued over a period spanning several years. Due to this, the 
Extended Validation (EV) status of all Certificates issued by Symantec-owned CA will no longer 
be recognised by the Chrome browser for at least a year (starting January 2017) until Symantec 
fixes its certificate issuance process so that it can be trusted again (Sleevi, 2017). The distrust of 
all existing Symantec-issued certificates would be gradual requiring that they be replaced over 
time with new, fully revalidated certificates, compliant with the current Baseline Requirements.  
2.5 Let’s Encrypt 
This is a free, automated and open certificate authority that uses ACME protocol to make it 




(Let's Encrypt, 2016). The main restriction with this is that it only offers certificates for web servers 
only for HTTPS communication. Also, a risk with this setup is certificate miss-issuance whereby 
a CA issues a certificate to an unauthorized person.  Despite Let’s Encrypt complying with industry 
standards, offering free certificates offered an attractive environment for phishers. In the period 
between January 1st, 2016 and March 6th, 2017 Let’s Encrypt had issued a total of 15,270 SSL 
certificates containing the word PayPal. Based on a random sample, 96.7% of these certificates 
were intended for use on phishing sites (Lync, 2017).   
2.6 Public Key Infrastructure in Kenya 
PKI in Kenya has seen tremendous changes in the near past. The Government of Kenya has a role 
to promote confidence and trust in the use of ICTs as a key driver of economic development. This 
is by extension ensuring that online business transactions are more secure. In 2013, there was a 
plan to implement the National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI), funded by the World Bank under 
the Kenya Transparency and Communications Infrastructure Project (KTCIP) which would 
provide the legal basis for both natural and legal persons (Mbuvi, 2013). With digital signatures, 
the Government hopes that Kenya will build a significant competitive edge by gaining access to 
services such as e-government. Therefore one would be able to be issued with their drivers’ license 
through online information systems (Angeng'o, 2013) and for enabling e-Government. PKI creates 
a safe online environment using electronic signature. Therefore the National PKI will enable and 
foster the development of various applications incorporating digital signature and hence lead to a 
trusted environment over open networks, (Communications Authority of Kenya , 2013). So as to 
achieve some of the goals under ICT this is one of the pillars of Vision 2030. 
Concerns have been raised over the security of having to store the root CA for Kenya’s PKI at 
Communications Authority of Kenya (CAK). This is because in the proposed framework, CCK 
will be both the licensing authority as well as the licensed, operator of the root CA. The conflict 
of interest is evident and also the end-to-end integrity of a structure that ensures top-down 
accountability is rendered completely void. The government should consider adopting a ‘public-
private Partnership’ for the implementation of an NPKI to avoid this and also free the Root CA 




2.7 Financial Return on Investment 
Reductions in cost are the most reliable drivers of financial returns for PKI-enabled applications, 
since they are easy to quantify, hence its popularity. Cost-based financial returns are expressed as 
a combination of cost saving, cost avoidance, efficiency and effectiveness.  
So as to know the financial return on investment, a business case analysis needs to be done which 
is beyond financial metrics. This may include security needs, business needs, and associated risks 
and qualitative benefits resulting from investment (Hamilton, Booz Allen &, 2000).  Figure 2.3 
gives the cost considerations of a CA. 
 
 





Figure 2.4 Business Case Analysis Methodologies for Certificate Authority (Hamilton, Booz 
Allen &, 2000) 
At its core any business case analysis is founded on comprehensive economic analysis: thus, the 
business case methodology will examine Certificate Authority in the context of its investment 
worthiness as well as its technical feasibility as shown in Figure 2.4  
2.8 Current Certificate Authority Tools  
This section reviews two proposed options for setting up private Certificate Authority. The ease 
of use and integration with existing environments are the pointers to selecting an appropriate CA 
setup. 
2.8.1 Enterprise Java Beans Certificate Authority 
This is CA software built on java technology and is run on Linux as the underlying operating 
system. It supports browser-based certificate creation and revocation as well as direct interaction 
with underlying enterprise java beans (EJBs). It stores its certificate in either an SQL database or 




2.8.2 Windows Server 2012 Certificate Authority 
This can run several services on a single server. Therefore, the CA would be run within a domain 
controller for easy distribution of certificates to endpoints within the domain controller. This 
supports manual and automatic Certificate enrollment and status functions (SANS, 2013). 
2.8.3 Linux Based OpenSSL Certificate Authority 
This is a CA that will be created using OpenSSL which is a free and open-source cryptographic 
library that provides several command-line tools for handling digital certificates.  
2.9 Conclusions 
From the reviewed literature, having an enterprise owned CA would provide a platform through 
which certificates can be generated for internal use whereby the enterprise would have control over 
all issued certificates, including renewal and revocation.  Since enterprises would be able to 
generate their own certificates, then the cost of purchasing Digital certificates would be eliminated. 
Also the most convenient tool to use for implementing a CA would be Windows server 2012 R2 
since this is a CA that can be installed, configured and managed that’s built on the operating system 













Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
The research aims at designing and implementing of a private Certificate Authority and how it 
would save costs for an enterprise. In this chapter the researcher explains the research methodology 
that was used, the stages in the research and justifies the research framework and the method. It 
focuses on the research design, types of data, data collection techniques and test design. 
3.2 Research Methodology Steps  
This research employed the Waterfall methodology which is a linear approach to software 
development (Lotz, 2013). Since the researcher will be doing a sequential development, the 
Waterfall methodology will give an exceptional development process. The first step was used to 
identify challenges in the Public Certificate Authority so as to show cause for the research so as to 
achieve the first objective. The second step was used to achieve the second objective of reviewing 
CA tools. The third, fourth and fifth steps were used to achieve the third objective through design, 
prototyping and testing of the prototype of both the functional and non-functional requirements. 
The last step was used to validate whether the research addressed the problem statement. This 





Figure 3.1 Research Methodology Steps (Lotz, 2013) 
The research design incorporated mainly quantitative research methods. Quantitative research was 
used to get a better understanding of current cost implications of buying digital certificates and 
getting the feedback from users on how user friendly the system was.    
3.2.1 Research  
System requirements were gathered through document and journal review and analysis of current 
systems. Personal interviews were conducted so as to get feedback on how the digital certificates 
are used and cost implication of purchasing digital certificates. The data collected was then 
analysed which showed the need for the proposed application. Due to the restricted number of the 
target population, the researcher interviewed system administrators within Telkom Kenya Limited. 















3.2.2 Certificate Authority Identification of Tools 
This step was used for identification of tools that would most appropriately suit the research which 
was based on the preliminary requirements identified in the research step. The tools were identified 
through document and journal review. This enabled the researcher to come up with the suitable 
tools for the implementation of the prototype.  
3.2.3 Prototype Design 
The Certificate Authority design was achieved based on collected information on system 
requirements and detailed analysis of the existing frameworks. Also, in this section, the researcher 
used workflow diagrams, use case diagrams, sequence diagrams and data flow diagrams (Hahnle 
& Tinelli, 2007). . 
3.2.4 Certificate Authority Prototyping 
Prototyping is a technology in which an approximation of a final system is built and tested. Using 
this approach (Beaudouin, Michel; Mackay, Wendy;, 2002), the study gathered preliminary 
requirements that were used to build an original version of the solution.  
3.2.5 Testing  
Upon completion of the implementation, it was important to perform tests to ensure the end product 
is working logically as expected and that it matched business needs. In this phase the prototype 
was evaluated to ensure it meets the research objectives.  
Also compatibility tests of the SSL certificates with different web browsers was done and also 
ensured minimum security requirements (Group, 2016) for the Certificate Authority were 
achieved.  This included testing of the digital certificates with different web browsers (Chrome, 
Firefox and Explorer) with different systems (Windows and Linux) were done of the digital 
certificates and also with different web browsers. Also the researcher ensured that minimum 
security requirements are met (Group, 2016). User tests were done to get feedback on the user-
friendliness of the system where users interacted with the system and answered a questionnaire for 
the same.  
A usability survey of the Certificate Authority was also done to ensure that the system is user 




3.2.6 Research Validation  
In this phase the Certificate Authority was evaluated to ensure it met the research objectives, which 
was analysis of costs saved when the Certificate Authority is implemented.  
3.3 Ethical Measures 
The research adhered to the ethical code of conduct by ensuring that all data collected was done at 
the will of the parties involved and that it was not mandatory to take part in the research. In 
situations where there was need to obtain permissions the research ensured that all the necessary 
arrangements had been made to obtain the required permissions to carry out the research. 
3.4 Location of Study 
The scope of the research was narrowed study was carried out in Nairobi County; targeting 
government institutions and large enterprises. This is because Nairobi harbors a majority of 
enterprises within the country which made it easy for the researcher to easily obtain data needed 
to facilitate the study. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter assisted in developing a conclusion based on data collected on whether the proposed 













Chapter 4: System Analysis and Design 
4.1 Introduction 
This section describes in detail the research design and comprises of feedback of the research 
findings, analysis of data, analysis of the system implemented and the design of the system. The 
data collected in this research was from a random sample of documents and was used to develop 
an analysis of the system which finally led to the design/ architecture chosen for the 
implementation. 
4.2 Research Findings 
Data collection was done through self-study, document review and personal interviews defined in 
Appendix I. The researcher used information provided by one Telecommunication Company 
(Telkom Kenya Limited) since this information was available upon request.  
At the moment, Telkom Kenya Limited does not run a private Certificate Authority. The digital 
certificates are mainly used for securing web servers and client authentication. This is for both 
internal Telkom Kenya Limited’s web services and other hosted enterprise customers. They used 
400 client certificates, 2,050 single certificates and 1 wildcard certificate. Averagely, $13,535 was 
spent per annum on purchasing of 51 digital certificates. The hosted enterprise customers purchase 
certificates and have them installed or have Telkom Kenya Limited purchase from other certificate 
authorities and install the certificate.   
Digital Certificate Usage 
E-mail Signing In the pipeline to implement in 2018 
Securing Web Servers and Web Applications  
Code Signing × 
Client Authentication  
 
There was also a plan to have 1,500 S/MIME certificates for signing of emails for its 1,500 




4.2.1 Digital Certificate Cost Findings 
The document review and questionnaire in Appendix I was focused on finding out how much was 
averagely spent on Digital Certificates and the cost incurred in purchasing of the same. The 
following findings were derived from the document review and questionnaire in Appendix I.  
i) Delivery of Service Using Digital Certificates 
Most sites that are not internally used and require that they be published to the public domain are 
considered to be at risk of breach of integrity and confidentiality. To ensure quality of service, 
whereby data accessed within the public domain is not tampered with, SSL certificates are installed 
in the hosting servers to enable secure connection between the requestor of information and the 
hosting server, whether an application service or a web service. Also, client certificates are used 
as a two-factor authentication method on critical systems where username and password are not 
adequate as a form of user authentication.  
ii) Digital Certificate Purchase Platforms Used 
Globally, the most trusted Certificate Authority providers are rated in this order, from the highest 
in ascending order: Comodo, Digicert, Entrust, Geotrust, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, Symantec and 
Thwate. Currently, enterprises buy their own certificates directly from Certificate Authorities 
online. The most common used is GoDaddy due to their relatively low market prices. However, 
there have been concerns of their trustworthiness on some platforms like the iOS and Safari 
browser. Also, others use third parties to buy the certificates. Case in Study, Telkom Kenya 
Limited purchases Digicert through Cloud Productivity Solutions and Entrust Digital Certificates 
through Lawtrust CA.  
iii) Challenges in Current Platforms 
The price of Digital Certificates are costly. For Telkom Kenya Limited is Certificates that had one 
Common Name and two Alternate Names at Ksh. 65,000 as of the year 2017 when bought through 
a third party (Cloud Productivity Solutions) which were valid for two years. Also, if buying 




Table 4.1 SSL Certificates Prices   
SSL Provider  Product Name 1Year 
Price 
Type Encryption 
Comodo CA Positive SSL $49.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Standard SSL $69.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA  Instant  SSL $99.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA  Comodo SSL $99.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Deluxe SSL $99.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Thwate Thwate 123 $149.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Geotrust Quick SSL Premium $149.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Positive SSl Wildcard $149.95 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Premium SSL $179.95 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Thwate SSL Webserver Certificate $199.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Geotrust TrueBusiness ID $199.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Premium SSL  $99.99 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Global Sign Domain ServerSign $249.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Thwate Webserver certificate with EV $299.00 One Domain 128/256 bit  
Geotrust TrueBusiness ID with EV $299.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Standard SSL Wildcard $299.99 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Globalsign Organisation ServerSign $349.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Symantec Secure Site SSL $399.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Go Daddy Deluxe SSL WildCard $399.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA EV SSL Certiticate $249.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Premium SSL Wilcard $449.95 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Comodo CA Comodo SSL wildcard $449.95 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Thwate Wildcard SSL Certificate $559.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
Geotrust TrueBusiness ID wildcard $599.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit  
GlobalSign Domain Serversign Wildcard $849.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 
GlobalSign Organisation Serversign Wildcard $949.00 Wildcard 128/256 bit 




Symantec Secure Site pro with EV $1499.00 One Domain 128/256 bit 
 
Also, some Certificate Authorities have been compromised in the past, for instance Symantec 
hence having their Certificates not to be trusted by others.  
4.2.2 Research Findings Conclusions   
From observation and research done, positive insight was received in how to set up the Certificate 
Authority. Also functional and non-functional requirements were formulated from this. These were 
the conclusions made from this process: 
i) Most enterprises were buying Digital Certificates from Certificate Authority providers. 
ii) There was need to develop a platform that will support generation, issuance and 
revocation of certificates at lower costs. 
iii) The Certificate Authority needs to be secure to avoid compromise of the systems and 
also the Certificates.  
4.3 Certificate Tools Findings  
The most appropriate certificate tools to use were Windows servers for both root and subordinate 
CA since it has in-built certificate authority services that can be configured. Also, it would be 
easier to integrate an enterprise subordinate CA with an already existing active directory and hence 
push the certificates to domain users and computers using group policy.   
4.4 System Design and Architecture 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The system design and architecture will cover how the platform was developed and tested. Based 
on the data collected, the research used UML diagrams as shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 
4.5 to model the systems in order to explain what was obtained from the collected data.  
4.4.2 Certificate Authority Analysis 
Based on research conducted, the system would need different modules. These are three windows 
servers (Windows server 2012 R2) and one Windows 10 endpoint. Licenses for Windows Server 




Based on the data collected, functional and non-functional requirements were formulated for the 
system. The system architecture comprises of two main modules. These modules are the root CA 
and the subordinate CA. 
a)  Functional Requirements 
i. Certificate Management 
The CA is majorly involved in management of certificates. This includes, issuing, 
revocation, publishing, archiving and renewal of digital certificates. 
ii. Validation of Certificate Signing Request 
The registration authority (which is also sometimes part of the CA) assures valid and 
correct registration. It will accept request for digital certificates and authenticate the entity 
making the request.  
iii. Path Validation  
Path Validation settings in group policy allows CA administrator to: 
a. Manage trusted root certificates-these control which root certification authority 
certifies and peer trust certificates in the user certificate and root certificate stores 
can be trusted. 
b. Manage trusted publishers- Control which code signing certificates can be 
accepted for and blocks certificates that are not trusted as per policy. 
c. Manage network retrieval and path validation- used to compensate for situations 
where downloads of a CRL fails because it is too large and network conditions are 
not optimal. 
d. Manage revocation checking policy. These can be set to coordinate use of CRLs 
and Online Responders during revocation checking.  
b)  Non-Functional Requirements 
a. Performance 
The infrastructure was developed on key considerations of performance aspect as 
processing speeds, throughput and utilisation.  
b. Reliability and Recoverability 
Developing a CA ensured that it is reliable and that a private key can be recovered by 
assigning a certificate for a recover agent (i.e. a certificate administrator) and enabling 





The CA is secured by having an offline root CA in that it is only powered during issuance 
and/or reissuance of the root certificate is required. If a root CA is compromised, then all 
certificates that were issued by that CA are also compromised and could compromise the 
security of an entire organisational network. Therefore, the root CA is never connected to 
any network to minimize the risk of the CA private keys becoming compromised.  
4.4.3 Certificate Authority Data Processing and Modeling  
The system design and architecture will cover how the platform was developed and tested. Based 
on the collected data the researcher used UML diagrams to model the system so as to explain what 
was obtained from the data collected. The user(s) in the certificate authority system provide request 
for certificate generation and generate a certificate and send it to the requester for installation on 
the specified system, whether within the organisation or an external requester. 
i. Process Workflow  
This portrays the flow of data and information through the system. This mainly assists in the logical 
design and defines the actions of defined decisions and information process flow as shown in 






Figure 4.1 Process Workflow Diagram 
 
ii) Use Case Modelling 
The use cases discussed below have been used to depict the processes in the system and their 
interactions. The actor is the CA administrator who generates certificate from CSR generated from 








a. Use Case Diagram 
Figure 4.2 depicts the various functionalities of the certificate authority and the relationship 
between the functions and system user. 
 
Figure 4.2 Use Case Diagram  
 
b. Use Case Description 
The main use cases that will be considered for description from the use case diagram are the build 
root CA, create subordinate CA, and generate certificate as they are the most critical processes of 
the application. Table 4.2 describes how a root CA is created. This is important since the root CA 




Table 4.2 Build Root CA  
Use Case Build Root CA 
Actor CA Administrator. 
Purpose To configure the root Certificate Authority. 
Overview 
This is the initial stage of setting up a CA where the root CA is 
built and the Root Certificate generated.  
Cross Reference Generate root certificate use case. 
Pre-Conditions Administrator must be logged in to the platform. 
Post Conditions 
The Root Certificate is stored in the local database of the root 
CA. 
The subordinate CA is used in signing of CSR and this hence forms the backbone of the Certificate 
authority as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Create Subordinate CA  
Use Case Create subordinate CA 
Actor CA Administrator. 
Purpose To install and configure the subordinate Certificate Authority. 
Overview 
The use case stars with using the root certificate to set up the 
subordinate CA. This is then used to sign certificate signing 
request to generate SSL Certificate. 
Cross Reference 
Generate root certificate use case, Submit CSR use case, Deploy 
Certificate Template use case, enable auto-enrolment use case 
and set revocation policies use case. 
Pre-Conditions 
Administrator must be logged in to the platform, have the root 
Certificate from root CA. 
Post Conditions The Root Certificate is stored in the local database of the root CA. 
After all this is set up, a certificate is then generated and this is represented by the Generate 
certificate use case as described in the Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Generate Certificate  




Actor CA Administrator. 
Purpose To generate Certificate from submitted CSR. 
Overview 
The subordinate CA signs the CSR submitted by the CA 
administrator and hence a Certificate is generated. 
Cross Reference Create subordinate CA use case and Submit CSR use case. 
Pre-Conditions 
Administrator must be logged in to the platform, subordinate CA 
must have been set up and a CSR generated from an external 
system requiring the certificate. 
Post Conditions 
A copy of the certificate is stored in the local database of the 
subordinate CA. 
 
ii) Sequence Diagram  
The sequence diagram in Figure 4.3 shows the flow of events within the certificate authority 






Figure 4.3 Sequence Diagram   
iv) Data Flow Diagrams 
These indicate flow of data from users to the different processes in the Certificate Authority system 
and their interactions with the process. Figure 4.4 shows level 0 diagram (context diagram) which 
is the high level diagram.  
 





Level 1 diagram in Figure 4.5 is a more detailed context data flow diagram. The context diagram 
has been broken down to give the details of the processes of certificate request, issuance and 
revocation. 
 
Figure 4.5 Level 1 Data Flow Diagram  
 
4.3.4 Database and Data Security 
The platform will handle certificates, certificate keys certificate revocation lists. Both the root CA 
and the subordinate CA will store their own certificate keys. The private keys for both were set at 
4096-bit key length using the hash algorithm SHA1 for signing certificates issued by the respective 
Certificate Authorities before they are stored locally in the system. The public keys for both the 





Also, the root Certificate Authority was offline after extraction of the root Certificate to ensure 





















Chapter 5: Prototyping and Prototype Testing 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the designs developed in Chapter 4, the system designs were developed and the prototype 
tested to ensure that the system functionalities were met. In this section the system implementation 
is discussed.  
5.2 Development Environment  
This was set up so as to facilitate the certificate authority implementation as per plan. This is 
elaborated in Table 5.1. 
Virtual Machine Name Role Configuration 
root_CA Root Certificate Authority 
Server with Windows Server 
2012 R2 
sub_CA  
Domain Controller, DNS Server, 
Subordinate CA 
Server with Windows Server 
2012 R2  
server1 Internet Information Services  
Server with Windows Server 
2012 R2 
rioba-PC Client Endpoint  Windows 10 
Table 5.1 Software Requirements 
 
5.3 Certificate Authority Set-up 
Both the root CA and the subordinate CA were built on Windows platform based on findings that 
most organisations used Windows for their Servers and end-user machines. The CA was built to 
issue certificates to computers connected to the Domain Controller through a group policy in the 
Active Directory.  
5.3.1 Root Certificate Authority 
This was set up and the root Certificate generated for use of signing for any certificate signing 
requests made to the root Certificate. Figure 5.1 shows the root configuration which includes the 





Figure 5.1 Root CA Setup  
5.3.2 Subordinate CA CSR signing 
When the Subordinate CA is set up a trust chain has to be established with the root CA. Therefore, 
a CSR is generated from the Subordinate CA and submitted to the root CA for signing.  
The CA window in Figure 5.2 shows the folders where the certificates are stored according to their 





Figure 5.2 Submitted Request from Subordinate CA  
Once the certificate request is signed, it is moved to the issued folder as shown in Figure 5.3 at 
which point it can be exported and used for the intended purpose.  
 
Figure 5.3 Issued Certificate from Root CA 
5.3.3 Certificate List 
The Certificate trust chain is now established as shown on Figure 5.4. The root CA Certificate is 
placed in the Trusted Root CA and the subordinate CA certificate placed in the Intermediate CA 





Figure 5.4 Root and Subordinate CA Certificate Chain  
For any other certificate issued by this CA will include this chain of trust as illustrated in the Figure 
5.5.  
 




5.3.4 Certificate Revocation 
Any certificates that have expired are listed in this folder. This includes those that have 
automatically expired and those that have manually been revoked due to other reasons like 
compromise of the issued certificates. 
5.3.5 Certificate Auto-enrollment  
Figure 5.4 shows the Certificate automatic enrollment which is set up via group policy in the 
domain controller which allows distribution of certificates without the awareness of the client. 
  
Figure 5.6 Enabling Auto-Enrollment  
 
5.3.6 OCSP Responder 
This checks for the certificate status and revocation status which is in two categories: when it 
expires after issuance or when it is revoked before expiry due to multiple reasons such as key 






Figure 5.7 OCSP Responder  
 
5.3.7 Certificate Auto-enrollment  
This enables the authenticated users to upload their certificate signing requests based on the 
available templates. These are promptly signed and issued and downloaded. Also the certificate 





Figure 5.8 Certificate Auto Enrollment Platform  
5.4 Certificate Issuance Process 
The user within the domain will receive the certificates on their certificate folders when they are 
deployed using group policy from the subordinates CA which run on the same server as the active 
directory.  For the users not in the domain, they have to submit certificate requests either via email 
as a text file or on the CA’s web auto enrollment platform. If on email, the CA administrator will 
load it in the request folder, have the CA issue the certificate and export it to a local folder within 
the CA. This is then shared with the user. If done via auto-enrollment, the certificate will 
automatically be loaded in the request folder and the administrator goes through the same process 
to issue. The requestor can check the status of the submitted signing request on the same platform. 
The CA administrator then shares the certificate with the requestor. For auto-enrollment, the 
certificate signing request will contain an email address which will be used to share the certificate. 
The process of domain validation has been eliminated since the domains used are dummy non-
registered domains.  
The certificate chain (root and subordinate CA certificates can be downloaded on the auto 





5.5 Prototype Testing 
The prototype testing included unit testing, integration testing with different browsers, functional 
testing to ensure the specified functionalities were fulfilled, usability testing.  
Test Case Name:      System Test 




Steps Action Expected Response Result Comment 
1 Check if certificate 
is shown on 
different browsers. 
Certificate should show on 
the browser certificate 
store 
Pass Installation Successful 
after pushing through 
group policy via active 
directory. However 
https runs only on 
Explorer and Edge 
browsers 
2 Check if 
application runs 
correctly. 
Both the root CA and 
subordinate CA should 
show active after setup 
Pass Functions worked and 
the appropriate layouts 
are displayed with the 
trust chain displayed 
within the certificate. 
3 Ease of Usability Show Pending requests, 
revoked certificates, 
issued certificates, failed 
requests.  
Pass This is shown as a list 
and easy to use since its 
GUI for both root and 
subordinate CA 
Table 5.2 Test Cases 
5.5.1 User Tests 
A system usability survey was conducted and results obtained are shown in Table 5.3  




Is the system user friendly 95% 5% 0% 
Ease of use of the system  94% 5% 1% 
Was the system responding fast enough? 98% 1% 1% 
I am willing to use this system for certificate 
management 
89% 3% 8% 
Table 5.3 Test Cases 
 
i) Ease of Use 
The study sought to find out the ease of use of the prototype which was analyzed by different users. 
A questionnaire was sent to the users and the response was analyzed. After the application was set 
up, the first impression of users on the application design, looks and color combinations was shown 
in Figure 5.9. 93% agreed that the system was user friendly and appealing, 2% disagreed and 5% 
were neutral 
 












ii) Core Functionalities 
The core functionalities were then checked by the users on how easy it was to find them and 
navigate through as shown in Figure 5.8. 94% agreed that it was easy to use, 5% were neutral and 
1% disagreed since in their day to day they mainly use Linux systems.  
 
Figure 5.10 Ease of Use  
 
iii) System Responsiveness 
During performance of different transactions, users tested how responsive the system was in terms 
of giving feedback during various transactions which were mainly, issuance, revocation and 










Figure 5.11 System Responsiveness 
iii) System Usage 
93% of the users interviewed agreed that the prototype was effective since it gave them control 
over the digital certificates that are required. Also, in the event of compromise, the digital 
certificate can be immediately revoked and another one issued. 5% were neutral and 2% disagreed. 
 














5.6 Cost of Setting Up and Running a Private CA  
The cost that was looked at in this study was CA initial costs, operational costs and maintenance 
costs over a period of two years since SSL/TLS certificates are required to be valid for a maximum 
of two years. For the purposes of this research, validity of a certificate was one year. This therefore 
was used across board for both code signing certificates and client certificates. 
Only one wildcard certificate was used since it can be used to secure 99 domains. Also, Entrust 
public CA was used since a quotation was available for other services such as managed PKI 
services.  
The researcher considered 50 multi-domain certificates; these have one common name and three 
alternative names at a cost of $278 and any extra name comes at an extra cost of $54 up to 250 
domains. However, for this case, we used the option of having only four domains per certificate 
so as to minimize exposure of the number of domains put to risk in the event that the private key 
of the certificate is compromised. This therefore meant a total of 299 domains would be 
considered.  Table 5.3 shows the cost of having a private CA versus buying digital certificates.  
This is only for certificates that would be used internally since the certificate would not be trusted 
in the public domain. Also it is with the assumption that the infrastructure is in place.  
 
   Private CA Cost Public CA Cost 
Cost 










Licenses $1,000 2 $2000 0 0 0 
Operational 
Salaries for CA 
admin (monthly) $3,000 12 $36,000 0 0 0 
Maintenance 
Disaster Recovery 
Test $120 1 $120 0 0 0 
 
Preventive 
Maintenance $120 4 $480 0 0 0 
Compliance Yearly Audits  1  0 0  
Certificate 
Production 






Certificate 0 1 0 $5350 1 $535 
Total 
  1 $36,800 $535 1 $13, 535 
 
Table 5.4 Cost Comparison 
 
Also so as to make economic sense the researcher used a maximum value of 100 digital certificates 
for each category; SSL certificate, S/MIME certificates, Client Certificates. 
Another scenario was having the certificate authority issue certificates to non-domain users. The 
case study was manly done for Telkom Kenya Limited who at the time of this research had 2,000 
web hosted enterprise customers. This therefore implied that other than the approximated 299 
certificates, an extra 2,000 certificates would be issued but at a cost. The cost would not be 
prohibitive so as to allow customers to choose the company’s CA certificates instead of buying 
from another public CA. This however introduced a challenge where users would get disclaimers 
that the site is not trusted. The viable solution to this would be to have a trusted root certificate 
sign the subordinate CA. For a public CA to sign another subordinate, the controls have to be 
checked and a thorough audit done so as to ensure that the subordinate CA complies with best 
practice and also the policies and standards set by the signing root CA. However, the researcher 
considered the option of having the root certificate included in browsers which would cost an 
initial $75,000 and subsequent annual fee of $10,000. The selling price for each certificate would 
be $50 for single certificates. The cost for wildcard certificates would be $100. However, since the 
customers are different this was not relevant to the research. If the certificates would not be sold, 
the running cost would be $36, 800 versus $535 for purchasing certificates.  
The internal certificates were not charged therefore only 2,050 single certificates and one wildcard 
would be produced but only 2,000 single certificates sold. Preventive maintenance is mainly for 
patching of the enterprise CA which would require restarts of the server and hence has to be done 
during a scheduled change window. The only cost would be overtime dues payed to the CA admin. 



















$1,000 2 $2,000 $1,000 2 $2,000 
Operational Salaries for CA 
admin (monthly) 
$3,000 12 $36,000 $3,000 12 $36,000 
Maintenance Disaster 
Recovery Tests 
$120 1 $120 $120 1 $120 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
$120 4 $480 $120 4 $480 
Compliance Annual Security 
Audits 






0 2,050 0 0 2,051 0 
Wildcard 
Certificates 
0 1 0 0 1 0 





$35 2,000 $70,000 $35 2,000 $70,000 
Wildcard 
Certificates 
$100 0 0 $100 0 0 
Total cost 
Difference 
   -$43,600   $21,400 
Table 5.5 Cost Comparison over Two Years 
 





Year two: $48,600 to run the CA and sell certificates worth 70,000. Profit made would be $21,400. 
This is also inclusive of the subsequent years since the initial audit cost is expensive. After the 
initial, the subsequent cost is a constant $10,000. 
The costs not included are backup costs, load balancing, virtualization software licenses and 
hardware, firewalls, and archival. This is because in the enterprise, these are already in place for 
both primary site and disaster recovery site.   
5.7 Cost Analysis 
i) When Setting up CA without Selling CA without Selling Certificates 
Table 5.5 indicates the cost that will be incurred yearly for running a CA without selling digital 
certificates. From this, purchasing certificates would be cheaper than building a CA. The cost 
incurred if a CA is set up would be $23,265 more than if digital certificates were bought.  
 Private CA Purchasing Certificates  Cost Difference 
Running Costs $36,800 $0  
Purchase Costs $0 $13,535  
Price Difference   $23,265 
Table 5.6 Cost Analysis I 
 
i) When Setting Up CA and Selling Solely Enterprise Customers  
Table 5.7 shows the costs over a period of six years with the cumulative profit made over that 
period. The assumption made is that the customer base will be constant and neither diminish or 
grow.  
Also, the researcher user different selling prices ranges; $20, $30 and $40. 
When certificates are sold at $20, a continuous loss would be experience if the number of 
certificates sold is 1,000 or 2,000. When selling 3,000 certificates, the breakeven point is 
experienced in the 6th year and in the 3rd year if selling 4000 or 5000 digital certificates. This is 





Selling Price @$20   
  Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6    
 Certificate 
Number 
 Running Cost 113,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 
Revenue 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
1,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -93,600 -122,200 -150,800 
-
179,400 -208,000 -236,600 
Revenue 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 2,000 
Certificates  Cumulative Profit Made -73,600 -82,200 -90,800 -99,400 -108,000 -116,600 
Revenue 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 3,0000 
certificates Cumulative Profit Made -53,600 -42,200 -30,800 -19,400 -8,000 3,400 
Revenue 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 4,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -33,600 -2,200 29,200 60,600 92,000 123,400 
Revenue 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 5,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -13,600 -37,800 89,200 140,600 192,000 243,400 
Table 5.7 Cost Analysis II 
 
Figure 5.13 indicates when the breakeven point will be achieved when selling different number 
of certificates at $20.  
 
Figure 5.13 Breakeven Point when Selling at $20 
When digital certificates are sold at $30, continuous losses are made when selling 1,000 




















2,000 and 3,000 certificates respectively. When selling 5,000 certificates, the breakeven point is 
achieved in the first year as in Table 5.8 
Selling Price @$30 
  Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6  Certificate 
Number 
  Running Cost 113,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 
Revenue 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 1,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -83,600 -102,200 -120,800 -139,400 -158,000 -176,600 
Revenue 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 2,000 
Certificates  Cumulative Profit Made -53,600 -42,200 -30,800 -19,400 -8,000 3,400 
Revenue 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 3,0000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -23,600 17,800 59,200 100,600 142,000 183,400 
Revenue 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 4,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made 6,400 77,800 149,200 220,600 292,000 363,400 
Revenue 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 150,000 5,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made 36,400 137,800 239,200 340,600 442,000 543,400 
Table 5.8 Cost Analysis III 
 
Figure 5.14 indicates when the breakeven point will be achieved when selling different number 
of certificates at $30.  
 




















When digital certificates are sold at $40, continuous losses are made when selling 1,000 
certificates. When Selling 3,000, 4,000 and 5,000 certificates the breakeven point is achieved in 
the first year as in Table 5.8 
Selling Price @$40 
  Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Year6   
Running Cost 113,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600 48,600   
Revenue 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 1,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made -73,600 -82,200 -90,800 -99,400 -108,000 -116,600 
Revenue 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 80,000 2,000 
Certificates  Cumulative Profit Made -33,600 -2,200 29,200 60,600 92,000 123,400 
Revenue 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 3,0000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made 6,400 77,800 149,200 220,600 292,000 363,400 
Revenue 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 4,000 
Certificates Cumulative Profit Made 46,400 157,800 269,200 380,600 492,000 603,400 
Revenue 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 200,000 5,000 
certificates Cumulative Profit Made 86,400 237,800 389,200 540,600 692,000 843,400 
Table 5.9 Cost Analysis IV 
 
Figure 5.15 indicates when the breakeven point will be achieved when selling different number 
of certificates at $40.  
 



















From the cost analysis above, it would cheaper if certificates were sold solely to enterprise 
customers. To break even, at $20, the certificates need to be over 3,000 certificates; at $30 and 
$40, equal to or greater than 2,000 certificates;  
5.8 Prototype Validation 
The prototype built did address the problem statement of cost saving whereby the enterprise will 
need to sell digital certificates to its enterprise customers so as to save costs. However, there needed 
to be a threshold to be reached. From the cost analysis done in section 5.7, the certificates to be 
sold to enterprise customers each at $20 need to be 3,000 yearly so as to reach the breakeven point 
in the sixth year; at $30, customer need to be over 2,000 or more. If customers are 2,000 the 
breakeven point will be reached in the sixth year. If sold at $40, the minimum customers need to 
be 2,000 so as to have a breakeven point at the third year. This therefore implies that the breakeven 
point is dependent on the price of the digital certificate.   
5.9 Conclusions 
The architecture of choice made it possible for an efficient implementation of the Certificate 
Authority. Waterfall methodology gave an opportunity for the implementation to be done in a 













Chapter. 6: Discussions of Results  
6.1 Introduction 
After the design, implementation and testing process, the study pursued to find out if the set 
objectives for the research were accomplished and how the developed solution relates with current 
systems so as to identify the strengths that would make it preferred option based against the current 
existing systems.  
6.2 Explanation of Findings  
The researcher worked together with IT personnel and also extracted information from already 
documented work to identify how to minimize costs of SSL Certificates. From the mentioned 
source, the researcher concluded that a different approach can be used other than the one already 
in place. The data collected was tailored to assist in answering and meeting the objectives of the 
research. The discussion below explains how the research objectives were met. 
6.3 Discussions 
The first objective in Section 1.3 was to identify challenges in the SSL Certificate Management. 
The study identified that most Enterprises spend a great deal of money on purchasing of SSL 
Certificates. Also some of the Certificate Authorities have been breached in the past due to lack of 
validation of the requestors information of who they claim to be. This has hence led to the actual 
Certificates being distrusted until they follow due process set by regulators. The second objective 
was to review the gap in the current Certificate Authority in terms of cost optimisation. The main 
challenge identified in the research was the relatively high cost of Certificates when bought from 
a public Certificate Authority service provider. This is dependent on the type of Certificate to be 
purchased and the validity period.  
The third objective was to design and implement a private Certificate Authority Infrastructure by 
use of a prototype. Section 4.3 System Design and Architecture describe how the design of the 
Certificate Authority was done in accordance to the system requirements. Chapter 5 describes the 
development process of the Certificate Authority as per the designs that had been developed. When 
building a Certificate Authority, the main cost would be the initial cost which includes hardware 
costs and periodic costs which includes purchase of software licenses and internal staffing cost for 




test in section 5.5. After successful testing, it was concluded that the Certificate Authority met the 
required functionalities. The final objective was to validate the built prototype and it was 
concluded that for costs to be saved, the CA would need to sell certificates to its enterprise 
customers at yearly. The certificate price and the amount of certificates determined the different 
breakeven points as depicted in Table 6.1. 
 Certificate Number 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
Price      
$20 - - Year6 Year3 Year3 
$30 - Year6 Year2 Year1 Year1 
$40 - Year3 Year1 Year1 Year1 
Table 6.1 Breakeven Points for Different Scenarios 
 
6.4 Advantages of the Private Certificate Authority versus Purchasing of Certificates. 
The developed Certificate Authority has the following advantages over purchased Digital 
Certificates. 
i) The process of issuing Certificates is faster since for internal requests, verifications are 
not required 
ii) The certificate can be trusted within a private network and loaded in the trusted root 
folders and intermediate CA and hence still usable even with the ‘untrusted disclaimer’ 
on browsers.  
iii) It is easy to revoke an issued certificate and the certificates can be given short validity 
period which reduces the scope of data compromised if server vulnerability is 
uncovered. 
6.5 Disadvantages of the Private Certificate Authority Prototype  
Certificates from a private CA will not be trusted unless it is added to the browser’s root list. This 
requires rigorous auditing and there is no single definition of what it means to be trusted, since 




necessarily cheaper since this is dependent of the amount of certificate being issued. This also does 
not make economic sense if the enterprise is a small one.  
6.6 Conclusions 
From the feedback received during the user test, the developed prototype received positive 
feedback. A private CA would be advantageous if the enterprise already has an equipped primary 
site and a disaster recovery site. For those that offer managed services like web service hosting, it 
would still require that the certificates are included in web browsers and this is done at an extra 
cost.  
To break even if selling at $20 the breakeven would be during the sixth year for 1,000 certificates 
and third year for both 4,000 and 5,000 certificates. If selling at $30 the breakeven would be during 
the sixth year if selling 2,000 certificates, second year if selling 3,000 and first year if selling 4,000 
and 5,000 certificates. If selling at $40, the breakeven would be during the third year if selling 
2,000 certificates during the first year is selling 3,000 certificate or more. It is therefore 
recommended that for enterprises who need to have services accessed by non-domain users, it is 
cheaper to purchase digital certificates and they are already publicly trusted if they do not have 













Chapter 7: Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusions 
From the research, it was concluded that the feasibility of running a cost effective private certificate 
authority depends on the type of business. It is cost effective for enterprises that already have 
infrastructure in place for their core business so that the CA services can ride on this infrastructure. 
These include backup costs, load balancing, virtualisation software licenses and hardware, 
firewalls, and archival. 
The users survey conducted users found the Microsoft based CA appealing and easy to use with 
minimal latency.  
From Chapter 6, it was evidently clear that there is a point below which a private CA would cost 
more to run than purchasing of digital certificates.  
7.2 Recommendations 
From the feedback received during the user test, the developed prototype received positive 
feedback. A private CA would be advantageous if the enterprise already has infrastructure set up 
on both the primary and disaster recovery sites.  
The breakeven points for different prices and different number of customers is given in Table 7.1 
 Certificate Number 
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
Price      
$20 - - Year6 Year3 Year3 
$30 - Year6 Year2 Year1 Year1 
$40 - Year3 Year1 Year1 Year1 
Table 7.1 Breakeven Points for Different Scenarios Summary 
 
Also for those that offer managed services like web service hosting, it would still require that the 
digital certificates are included in web browsers and this is done at an extra cost after a satisfactory 




The cost of the certificates needs to be considerably affordable so as to be attractive to the customer 
who is being on boarded. Also it should be included in the contract and service level agreement 
document so that it is viewed as a value addition rather than an extra cost as much as it could be 
negligible.   
7.3 Future Work 
The researcher focused this study on a single case study which is a telecommunication company 
and offers managed services to its clients.  The researcher recommended that a cost comparison 
be done using other trusted root certificate authorities for cross signing so as to have the CA issue 
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APPENDIX I: Digital Certificates Interview Questions 
Pre-Prototyping  
This Interview was designed to get feedback on the cost implication of purchasing of digital 
certificates so to help to in finding out whether running a private certificate authority would be a 
cheaper option.  
1. Do you run a private certificate authority? 
() Yes   
() No   
2.  What do you use digital certificates for? 
() E-mail signing  
() Securing Web Servers  
() Code Signing  
() Client Authentication 
3.  If any other is used, kindly list them. 
   _________________________________________________________________________ 















APPENDIX II: User Experience Feedback 
Post-Prototyping 
This questionnaire was designed to get feedback on the CA prototype and help improve or address 
any features of concern. Please ascertain if you are able to view load a certificate signing request, 
issue a certificate, revoke it and push certificates to endpoints using group policy. 
1.  The prototype was appealing  
() Agree  
 () Disagree 
2. If you disagree, kindly give your reason 
   _________________________________________________________________________ 
3.  Core functionalities were easy to find.  
() Agree  
() Neutral  
() Disagree 
4.  The application was responsive when interacting with and performing background tasks.  
() Agree  
() Neutral  
() Disagree 
5. Would you consider the application more effective as compared to the current system? 
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